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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUTHS. H1LTSLEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HALLALENE M. RYDER, 
Defendant- Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
No. 19145 
Defendant appeals from judgment in favor of the Plaintiff 
granting a $4,924.66 judgment in favor of Plaintiff personally 
and determining that Money Market Certificates or savings qeposits 
amounting to $33,623.43, and an investment of $10,000.00 in 
Defendant's condo, were assets of Etta Wood, a deceased sister of 
the deceased Milton J. Hiltsley. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court from a judgment in favor 
of Plaintiff as to $4,924.66 and determining that other assets 
had been disposed of bv the deceased Milton J. Hiltsley during 
his lifetime which belonged to his deceased sister, Etta Wood, 
Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the jl>dgment and an award 
uf all monies ordered by the court paid to Plaintiff and the heirs 
uf Etta Wc'od. Plain::iff requests that the judgment be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff in the case is Ruth Hiltsley as the Personal 
Representative of the estate of Milton J. Hiltsley and in her 
own behalf as the surviving widow. 
During the trial of the case before Judge Croft, there was 
introduced in evidence a journal kept by Milton J. Hiltsley during 
his lifetime and in his own handwriting. It is Exhibit 10-P. 
It was used by all parties and accepted without objection for 
its content by the court. An entry at Page 253 of Exhibit 10-P 
contained the following 12nguage: 
Received money from Etta's account, transferred to 
Salt Lake from Albuquerque, New Mexico, $30,000 plus 
$314, a shortage of $8.00 plus. 
The entry also contains the following language: 
Placed $10,000 in savings passbook. Placed $10,000 
in money market at Am Savings, $10,000 in money market 
at PFS. 
Certificates of deposit and Money Market Certificates were 
introduced to trace through the disposition of the $30,000.00 
that was received on the 5th of October, 1979. Judge Croft, 
in an extensive and carefully written Memorandum Decision 
(Tr. 38-55), traced the various sums from the Etta Wood original 
deposits into Account No. ll-013277-9 at American Savings. This 
account was originally in the name of M. J. Hiltsley and Ruth S. 
Hiltsley. It was opened on February 14, 1980. It was closed on 
August 25, 1981, the day before Milton J. Hiltsley died. A 
certificate was issued August 25, 1981 in the name of M. J. 
-3-
Hiltsley and Defendant Hallalene M. Ryder, with an opening 
amount of $15,259. 78. 
Defendant made no claim to any of the proceeds in the 
account prior to the date that it was opened in her name and 
the deceased on August 25, 1981. Court found that this initial 
deposit at American Savings & Loan of $10,000.00 came from the 
Etta Wood transferred funds. 
The court traced $10,000.00 from Etta Wood into Account 
No. 715-101422-2 at Prudential Federal Savings & Loan, originally 
in the name of M. J. Hiltsley alone, and was eventually traced 
to Money Market Certificate No. 11647 issued on February 25, 1981 
in the face amount of $17,000.00 to M. J. Hiltsley and Hallalene 
Ryder as joint tenants with right of survivorship. This Money 
Market Certificate was found in the home of Plaintiff following 
the death of M. J. Hiltsley. It was claimed by Defendant Ryder 
under an Affidavit and Guarantee for Lost Evidence of Account 
(Ex. 30-P). Through this document, Defendant caused Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan to issue a new savings account, 
No. 003-300723-6 (Ex. 32-P), in the name of Hallalene Ryder and 
W. Fred Hansen as joint tenants. Neither Ryder nor Hansen claimed 
any interest in the funds at Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
prior to the issuance on February 25, 1981 of the Money Market 
Savings Certificate. 
An additional account at American Savings & Loan Association 
is Account No. 1-048466, which contained Etta Wood funds. It was 
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Exhibit 40-D supplied by Defendant shows the sums that 
she contributed to the purchase price of the condominium. Two 
checks to close out this balance are exhibits. They are 
Exhibit 20-P and Exhibit 21-P. Neither of the checks was endorsed 
by Plaintiff, though made payable to her. Exhibit 21-P was 
payable to all three, the Hiltsleys and H. M. Ryder. The Court 
determined that Ruth Hiltsley was a tenant in common in the 
proceeds in American Savings & Loan as shown by the passbook 
(Ex. 5-P). He gave the Defendant credit for all sums that she 
deposited into the account, held that the $10,000.00 item was an 
asset of the heirs of Etta Wood, and then divided the difference 
between the tenants in common, M. J. Hiltsley and Ruth S. Hiltsley 
since Ruth Hiltsley did not endorse the checks on the condo, and 
awarded her the judgment for $4,924.66, her undivided one-half. 
Plaintiff submits that there can be no question about the accuracy 
and the propriety of the award to the heirs of Etta Wood and 
Ruth Hiltsley of the sums that are invested in the Defendant's 
condo. 
Etta Wood died on the 20th of January, 1980 (Ex. 10, pg 2481 
The record of M. J. Hiltsley shows that $10,000.00 in money market 
at American Savings & Loan was invested out of her $30,000.00 
(Ex. 10, pg 253). The records at American Savings & Loan show 
an account opened on the 14th of February, 1980 in the amount of 
$12,000.00, Account No. 11-013277-9, is referred to on the Money 
Market Certificate (Ex. 4-P) in the face amount of $15,259. 78. 
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ThP. account was changed into the name of M. J. Hiltsley 
and Defendant Hallalene M. Ryder on the 25th of August, 1982 as 
shown by Exhibit 19-P. This was the day before M. J. Hiltsley 
died. Court found that this account contained the $10,000.00 
of Etta Wood, money referred to in the ledger as being invested 
in the Money Market Certificate at American Savings & Loan. 
This is one of the items that the trial court held to bP. an asset 
of the estate of Etta Wood and the property of her heirs. 
The documents support in every way the finding of the Court. 
There was no contrary evidence, and Defendant makes no claim that 
she in any way contributed to the American Savings & Loan Account 
No. 11-013277-9 represented by the Money Market Certificate. 
Two accounts are shown to have been at Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan. One account in the name of M. J. Hiltsley and 
Ha1lalene Ryder was opened on the 19th of July, 1979 and paid out 
on the 16th of July, 1981. This account is shown by Exhibits 
22-P and 23-P. The account predates the receipt by M. J. Hiltsley 
of the Etta Wood assets and the payment does not correspond to 
any of the payments that are material to disposition of this 
matter. Court held that this item was not involved in the Etta 
Wood estate or gave no interest in it to the Plaintiff. What 
happened to the money upon payment is not known. 
ThP. other account was opened at Prudential Federal Savings 
& Loan on the 22nd of February, 1980 (R. 24-P) in the name of 
M. J. Hiltsley only. It was closed on the 28th of August, 1980 
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It seems clear to me that Milton must be considered 
as having received that $30,000.00 in trust for Etta 
and this money was not his money to invest as he did 
and did not become his upon her death to give away 
or use for his own purposes. It is thus apparent 
that at least $10,000.00 in each of the three accounts 
mentioned came from Etta's funds. 
It is supported by clear, convincing and undisputed evidence. 
The finding by the Court would classify Milton J. Hiltsley 
as a "conscious wrongdoer". This court has held in Park v. Zions 
First National Bank, et al, filed September 22, 1983, that such 
a wrongdoer may be held to restore the fund diverted and also 
pay all profits. The language of the court seems especially 
fitting in the facts of the present case: 
Where a person by the consciously wrongful disposition 
of the property of another acquires other property, the 
person whose property is so used is not only entitled 
to hold the wrongdoer personally liable for the value 
of the property wrongfully disposed of but he is entitled 
as an alternative to the property so acquired. If the 
property so acquires is or becomes more valuable than 
the property used in acquiring it, the profit thus made 
by the wrongdoer cannot be retained by him; the person 
whose property was used in making the profit is entitled 
to it. Restatement of Restitution Section 202 
colIID1ent c (1937). 
The reasoning behind this rule has been stated thus: 
If, however, the wrongdoer were permitted to keep the 
profit, there would be an incentive to wrongdoing, 
which is removed if he is compelled to surrender the 
profit. The rule which compels the wrongdoer to bear 
any losses and to surrender any profits operates as a 
deterrent upon the wrongful disposition of the 
property of others. 
The Personal Representative of Milton J. Hiltsley is 
vitally interested in retrieving the property diverted from Etta 
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Wood's estate since the estate is liable for such diversion. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT NOW HAS COLOR OF TITLE TO ASSETS OF PLAINTIFF 
AND ESTATE OF ETTA WOOD. 
It is undisputed that there are assets to which Defendant 
presently has title and on which the court has determined a trust 
should be imposed in favor of the heirs of Etta Wood. 
The Probate Code of the State of Utah, UCA 75-3-101, 
provides that upon the death of a person, his real and personal 
property devolves to his heirs. Upon the death of Etta Wood, 
the property that she owned then devolved to her heirs. 
It is undisputed that the deceased Milton J. Hiltsley did 
not distribute the property received from Etta Wood to her heirs 
and did not make any attempt whatever to probate the estate of 
Etta Wood. 
UCA 75-1-106, entitled "Effect of Fraud and Evasion", 
provides that if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the 
provisions or purposes of the Probate Code, any person injured 
thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator 
of the fraud or restitution from any person other than a bona fide 
purchaser benefiting from the fraud, whether innocent or not. 
It is apparent that the Probate Code is intended to provide 
relief to people who are in the position of Plaintiff or who are 
in the position of the heirs of Etta Wood. 
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As has been set out in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment of the court (Tr. 86-98), the mechanism for 
recognizing the interest of the heirs of Etta Wood was that the 
assets should be paid to the Personal Representative of Etta 
Wood. The alternative method proposed by Plaintiff at the trial 
level (Tr. 69-85) was a judgment in favor of the Personal 
RPpresentative of Milton J. Hiltsley and a trust imposed on the 
proceeds for the benefit of the heirs of Milton J. Hiltsley. 
This proposal was objected to by the Defendant, who now appeals 
from the decision to give a direct judgment rather than impose a 
trust on the asset in the estate of Milton J. Hiltsley. 
An ultimate effect of the procedures followed by the court 
or as proposed by Plaintiff would be the same. As the court now 
knows, there has been a Personal Representative appointed for the 
estate of Etta Wood and motion filed by Plaintiff's attorney to 
join the estate of Etta Wood in this action. 
As Plaintiff reads the brief of Defendant, it is an 
objection to the court determining that there are assets subject 
to a trust in the estate of Milton J. Hiltsley which are in 
possession under claim of title by Defendant. A modification of 
the order of the court giving a direct judgment to the Personal 
RPpresentative of Milton J. Hiltsley, then imposing a trust on 
the assets in favor of the estate of Etta Wood, should be a 
simple matter for this Court to order if that result is ciPemed 
appropriate. 
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The Findings and Conclusions of the trial court that the 
assets handled by deceased M. J. Hiltsley are trust assets, are 
supported by uncontroverted, substantial evidence. Plaintiff 
submits the evidence is undisputed. Certainly relitigation or 
retrial of this matter is not an efficient or necessary result 
which should be ordered by this Court. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM ATTEMPTING TO RELITIGATE THE 
OWNERSHIP OF THE ASSETS RECEIVED FROMM. J. HILTSLEY 
BY D0CTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
Defendant, in the trial of the matter, had every opportunity 
to litigate the question of the source of the assets that 
ultimately came into her possession and on which she had a 
record title. There is no claim that she made any contribution 
to the assets or that there were any of her assets commingled 
with the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff or the determination 
that there was a trust on the assets handled by M. J. Hiltsley 
which he received from his deceased sister, Etta Wood. 
had every opportunity to present any evidence of her interest in 
the assets or any evidence she might have relating to the use 
by M. J. Hiltsley of the assets of Etta Wood. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no evidence of 
any kind that the assets that were ultimately used and which 
came into the hands of Defendant were not assets of the estate 
of Etta Wood. The $4,900.00 judgment that Plaintiff obtained 
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by reason of her tenancy in common relationship in the savings 
account at American Savings & Loan is clearly supported and 
undisputed and legally unassailable. 
Clearly the law is that one tenant in common cannot dispose 
of another tenant in common's asset without the nonparticipating 
tenant in common consenting or being willing that her asset be 
used. It seems relatively undisputed that the Plaintiff, in her 
personal right, is entitled to a judgment of the $4,900.00 
interest in the condominium of Defendant. 
As to the balance of the bank accounts, having had an 
opportunity to litigate and to present all evidence available on 
the ownership of the assets in her possession and on which she 
has record title, Defendant i8 now barred from relitigating this 
issue by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
This Court, in a series of recent cases, has clearly and 
carefully set down the manner in which the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues that have been 
litigated in a trial proceeding. In Wilde v. Mid-Century 
Insurance Co., Utah, 635 P.2d 417, this Court states the doctrine 
in the following language: 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel governs the 
resolution of the issues in this case. The purpose 
of that doctrine is to prevent the relitigation of 
issues which a party has once actually litigated. 
As the doctrine was originally formulated, it 
required thal the parties be the: sdme in the: first 
and second Mu:uali: of parties is 
no longer essenti<:Jl, howe':ter T is .:urisJicci,,n, 
following the la!1dmark Jecisi,m P EcrnhcirJ \". !:Link 
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of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assoc., 19 Cal.2d 
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), dispensed with mutuality 
in collateral estoppel cases. Searle Bros. v. Searle, 
Utah, 588 P.2d 689 (1978). 
Court set down the principles involved and necessary for the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel in the following language: 
(2,3) To invoke the doctrine, it must be demonstrated 
(1) that the issue decided in the previous action 
was identical to that tried in the subsequent action; 
(2) that the issue was decided in a final judgment on 
the merits; and (3) that the issue in the first case 
was competently, fully, and fairly litigated by the 
party against whom the doctrine is invoked. Searle Bros. 
v. Searle, Utah, supra, at 691. See also Teitelbaum 
Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 25 
Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439 (1962). If these conditions 
are met, the party against whom the original judgment 
was rendered is bound, and so are those in privity 
with that party. 
There has been an argument made in the past that a party 
not a litigant could not be bound by the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel since the party would not be objecting to the findings 
of the court had the issues been decided against such a party, 
and that the doctrine of mutuality prevents such a party from 
taking advantage of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
In a subsequent case, the court again adhered to and 
upheld the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and specifically 
indicated the manner in which that doctrine works as far as 
parties who are strangers to a judgment and are the prevailing 
party. In Nielson v. Droubay, Utah, 652 P.2d 1293, the court 
made the following holding: 
[2,3) In this jurisdiction we have abandoned the 
rule requiring mutuality of parties in collateral 
estoppel cases. The established rule is that a 
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stranger to a judgment may assert a judgment against 
one who actually litigated an issue and was 
necessarily precluded by the judgment and thereby 
preclude the relitigation of the same issue. 
Searle Brothers v. Searle, supra, Richards v. Hodson, 
26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971). However, the 
converse is not true. One who has litigated an issue 
may not assert a favorable judgment against another 
who did not have an opportunity to litigate the issue. 
Ruffinengo v. Miller, Utah, 579 P.2d 342 (1978); 
State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962). 
Because the Droubays were not parties to the Equitable 
action, the judgment in that case does not preclude 
the litigation of their claim that the option was 
exercised. 
See also Schaer v. State, by and through Utah Department 
of Transportation, Utah, 657 P.2d 1337. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied in the 
facts and circumstances before the Court in this matter, would 
and should not require relitigation. The parties present are 
bound b;r the determination made by the trial court. 
The trust which was found by the Court to exist can easily 
be imposed upon the assets in the hands of the Personal 
Representative of Milton J. Hiltsley; or if the Court considers 
it necessary to place the assets in a properly appointed Personal 
Representative for the estate of Etta Wood, such an entity now 
exists as the record in this appellate proceeding demonstrates. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the findings of the trial court 
are so substantially and clearly supported by the evidence that 
the findings should be affirmed on this appeal, that such orders 
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as are necessary to prevent relitigation should be made and 
fashioned by this Court, that with said modifications the 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and Plaintiff 
should be awarded her costs herein on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED day of October, 1983. 
